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n the Anthropocene, man is put 
back at the heart of the universe. In 
this era, where human technology 
may not only alter the immediate 
surroundings but the atmosphere of the 
planet, the questions of intergenerational 
justice have to be posed with new vigour. 
In light of radioactive waste, permafrost 
melting and rising sea levels, it is well 
known that the decisions that lead to a 
higher standard of living for many to-
day, may leave future generations with a 
planet hostile to life. Future generations, 
though, have of course no possibility to 
participate in the decision-making pro-
cess of the present. Yet there has been a 
debate on whether this might be changed 
and how. The most recent published vol-
ume is Gosseries and González-Ricoy's 
Institutions for Future Generations (2016), 
wherein Karnein (2016) and Skagen Ekeli 
(2016) address the challenges of political 
representation for future generations. Law-
rence (2014) explores the possibilities of 
representing future generations in interna-
tional law; Bailey, Farell and Mattei (2013) 
discuss the possibilities of protecting the 
rights of future generations through com-
mons; and Thompson (2010) argues that it 
is possible to anticipate future generations’ 
interests and therefore they should be rep-
resented. Is this justifiable under democrat-
ic rule? The monograph Die Repräsentation 
von Non­Voice­Parties in Demokratien by 
Lukas Köhler goes even further and argues 
that it is not only justifiable but necessary. 
He seeks to base the argument for the rep-
resentation of future generations on a theo-
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tion of interests that will benefit both current and future genera-
tions (such as the guarantee of a healthful environment). Boston 
is generally skeptical that constitutional provisions are useful for 
accomplishing this goal (with the possible exception of the right 
to an ecologically healthy environment). He argues that defin-
ing the interests of future generations can pose difficulties, as can 
designing institutional mechanisms to protect those interests. 
 Finally, constitutional engineering imposes costs as well as offer-
ing potential benefits, and in the absence of strong evidence that 
the benefits outweigh the costs, the enterprise strikes Boston as 
both difficult and inherently risky (235f ). In the end, he con-
cludes that “[r]elying on constitutional reforms to mitigate pre-
sentist tendencies … is unlikely to be the most effective of the 
options available.” (236)
The other side of this argument is that many of the same ques-
tions can be raised about any changes to constitutional provisions, 
or, indeed, about adopting a constitution in the first place. They, 
too, are difficult to adopt, may impose costs as well as conferring 
 benefits, and can be difficult to design well. Yet there is widespread 
agreement that the benefits of constitutions generally outweigh 
the costs, and that they are worth the effort. This is not to say 
that Boston’s assessment of the desirability of using constitutions 
to protect the interests of future generations is necessarily wrong. 
But it is also not clear that this assessment is right.
Governing for the Future is not a book one reads casually. Even for 
readers with some background, it can be a difficult read. This is 
largely a consequence of the systematic approach the author takes 
to examining the many aspects of the problem of governing for 
the future.  The most obvious target audience for this work is as a 
text in an advanced public policy course. The book will also be of 
great interest to academics and policy-makers looking for a rigor-
ous work on developing long-term public policy. It is a book one 
would read and then return to re-read chapters of special interest. 
On the other hand, readers without sufficient background in pub-
lic policy are likely to find Governing for the Future frustrating. In 
a number of cases, the conclusion of a chapter is that the particu-
lar approach examined is not fruitful. It is hard to fault Boston for 
his conclusions, and even harder to fault him for the difficulty in-
herent in finding solutions to the problem of presentism he seeks 
to address – but while Governing for the Future is an important 
work, it is also a complex and, at times, a difficult work.
Boston, Jonathan (2017): Governing for the Future: Designing Demo ­ 
cratic Institutions for a Better Tomorrow. Bingley, UK: Emerald Pub­




ry of state rather than on democratic rule. In the process, the book 
builds a bridge between the arguments of contractual theorists 
and current academics and provides the logical proof that the rep-
resentation of future generations’ interests is a necessary condition 
for democratic state legitimacy.
Köhler bases his discussion on the fact that there are a number of 
people affected by state actions who nonetheless do not have the 
right to vote, nor any opportunity to promote their interests in 
policy formulation. He frames this question as a matter of legiti-
macy. Legitimacy of state actions has been described as a “precar-
ious resource” which is achieved and sustained under democratic 
rule through constant debate and public discourse. This confronts 
democratic rule with a series of awkward questions. If all power 
emanates from the people, how is it that some are not part of the 
people? And should or must democracy take into account and 
engage the interest of all those possibly affected by state actions to 
claim legitimacy?
The book seeks to answer those questions with arguments from 
political philosophy and law and by means of reconstruction. 
Köhler defines future generations as part of non-voice-parties, 
which are “groups of people that cannot vote, yet are (nonethe-
less) affected by state actions and that may be clearly defined by 
one specific characteristic” (28, own translation). He maps out 
the three main concepts that are put under pressure within this 
debate: the fundamental legitimation of a state, the definition and 
constitution of the “people”, and the appropriate form of rep-
resentation.
While first explaining his methodology of reconstruction and de-
fining the term “non-voice-parties” (chapter 2), Köhler turns to 
the discussions on the purposes of states (chapter 3), state for-
mation (chapter 4), the legitimacy of representation (chapter 5) 
and proposals for the actual implementation of the representation 
of non-voice-parties (chapter 6). Finally he engages with possible 
criticism (chapter 7), summarises his argument (chapter 8) and 
gives an outlook on the prospect for the representation of the in-
terests of future generations (chapter 9).
Köhler’s main concern is to find a modification of the All- 
Affected-Principle (AAP) that avoids its two major criticisms. The 
AAP is the solution to the democratic boundary problem and the 
problem of defining the legitimate sovereign. In its simplest form 
it states that anybody actually affected by state actions has to be 
represented in the decision-making process (32). The boundary 
problem arises because state actions could affect people living out-
side of a given polity and therefore the democratic decision-mak-
ing-process might be compromised (32). The definition of the 
legitimate sovereign is a challenge to democratic theory, because 
if democratic legitimacy must be based on democratic legitimacy 
the argument could go on indefinitely, hence resulting in an in-
finite regress (33). Köhler engages with the two most prominent 
solutions to these problems given in the literature. The first, exem-
plified by the position held by Goodin, holds that the question of 
being actually affected is not a political or ethical one, but rather 
an epistemological one. According to this, state actions are inter-
dependent and complex and thus there is no reasonable argument 
for excluding anybody in the decision-making-process. In conse-
quence, this argument leads to the plea for a world state with a 
world citizenry (35). A second position, held by Sofia Nässtrom, 
states that only the ones subjected to a polity must be includ-
ed. This reduces the relevant people to those who live under an 
already existing legal framework. Yet, as she points out, this es-
tablishes “citizen” as a hierarchising category among humans and 
“state” is its enacting institution, therefore it is not possible to 
normatively justify either of them (39).
Köhler sees these problems arising because the theorists either 
view democracy as the principle on which they must base their 
arguments (as he says is the case with Arrhenius, Goodin and 
Dahl), or they do not find sufficient arguments to justify states 
(Nässtrom) (37). He leans towards a slightly modified version of 
the All-Subjected-Principle, yet to avoid Nässtrom’s conclusions 
he needs to find arguments that justify the existence of a state 
(37). In order to achieve his goals he grounds his argument in the 
basic legitimation of state.
He proceeds in reconstructing the discourses of functional (chap-
ter 3) and basic legitimacy (chapter 4) to prove that non-voice-
parties need to be represented in democracies. Because he focuses 
on Western democracies, Köhler focuses on the classical debates 
on state formation from Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Kant and 
Mill, and the debates of criteria for legitimacy and its production 
from Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas. He demonstrates that 
basic legitimacy derives from natural laws, contractual theory and 
the idea of human in these theories.
In this reconstruction of discourses Köhler points out that the 
justification of state functions derive from the justification of state 
formation. The pragmatist notion of the rule of law does only 
justify state actions within an existing legal framework but does 
not apply when this legal framework comes under pressure and its 
legitimacy claims are contested. Therefore it excludes the central 
question of what makes “state” a legitimate power towards human 
(40ff.).
This is why Köhler turns to the natural law debate and argues 
that the state is the best institution to provide protection against 
anarchic violence. Köhler identifies the protection of pursuing 
self­interests safely and the protection of human dignity as the basic 
justifications for state formation, i.e. the establishment of a social 
contract. With Rousseau this contract establishes civic equality, 
in which all consent to subject themselves under a specific legal 
framework. Because of this equality, everybody born into the 
social contract, and thereby affected by it, needs to legitimise it 
and must be considered as contractual subjects (113). This is why 
future generations, too, need to be considered as contractual sub-
jects, i.e. part of the people (114).
Yet the justification of state formation on the grounds of rational 
interests is insufficient because interests are contingent, contradic-
tory and inconsistent (116). Pre-civic human dignity provides the 
second line of argument. The social contract that founds the state, 
and legitimises the state to act, derives its legitimacy from the 
promise to protect the right to human dignity. Thus, it is human 
nature that is at the heart of the relationship between state and 
human and ultimately legitimises any polity. This is why and how 
Köhler concludes that the right to be represented derives from 
being human and not from being a citizen. Therefore the rep-
resentation of all affected people is a necessary condition (sine qua 
non) for legitimate democratic rule.
After he has established and proved theoretically that non-voice 
parties are part of the affected people, who need to be included 
into the social contract and thus need to be represented in democ-
racies, Köhler turns to the question of how the representation of 




eration of the arguments given in the literature on authority and 
accountability, he mainly follows Rehfeld in concluding that the 
legitimate way to represent the interests of non-voice parties is in 
the form of an anticipatory representation that aims for the best 
interest of the represented (153). Because non-voice-parties do 
not have the opportunity to ensure accountability through voting 
(136), Köhler argues for a deliberative system of accountability. 
He states that the criteria for legitimate representation are the 
comprehensible and transparent establishment of rules and their 
acceptance by an audience (157). Democracies, therefore, need 
to represent the interests of every group possibly affected by its 
actions to keep their basic legitimacy intact. This includes non-
voice-parties and, as such, future generations. However, this does 
not mean that they need to be part of those who vote, because 
there are other ways how their interests might be represented. 
This way, Köhler avoids the argument for a world citizenry or the 
abolition of the state.
In the remaining chapters Köhler very briefly illustrates the 
Swedish concept of ombudsman for future generations as a re-
alistic possibility for the implementation of future generations’ 
representation in democracies (chapter 6). He distinguishes be-
tween non-voice-parties and structural minorities by introducing 
the case of the South Schleswig Voters’ Association, a German 
party representing the Danish and Frisian minorities of the north 
German state Schleswig-Holstein who are foreigners, yet allowed 
to vote (173). The last three chapters defend his argument and 
highlight that his approach, which deduces basic state legitimacy 
from human dignity and self-interest, proves that henceforth the 
representation of non-voice-parties’ interests is a question of state 
legitimacy. Since there is no need for “descriptive representation” 
but anticipatory representation suffices, there is no need for wid-
ening the citizenry beyond those who can vote. Through the es-
tablishment of an ombudsman, non-voice-parties’ interests can be 
represented and the criticism aimed at the All-Affected-Principle 
does not apply to his approach (176-190).
As a dissertation in political philosophy the book follows the 
structure of a logical proof. Therefore the reconstruction of the 
classical democratic theory discourses, which leads to the proof 
that non-voice-parties need to be represented in democracies, 
takes up the most part of the book. As a result, the amount of 
chapters focusing on representation and the presentation of real-
istic implementation possibilities seems comparably small. Thus, 
while one can appreciate the author’s overall aim to provide argu-
ments for the representation of non-voice-parties in democracies, 
there are some questions in want of deeper discussion from the 
perspective of political science.
It is particularly the organisation and implementation of the rep-
resentation of future generations’ interests as non-voice-parties 
that pose challenges to democratic rule, and therefore it is a pity 
that some of the discussions have been cut short. An interesting 
point of discussion would have been the danger of moral hazard 
in justifying unpopular policies in the present with reference to 
future generations’ interests, as Karnein (2016) has stressed. The 
main critique presented here will focus on matters of “descriptive 
representation”, which play only a minor part in Köhler’s argu-
ment, yet are at the core of the questions the reading raises for 
political implementation. Pitkin’s contribution for the study of 
representation has been appreciated as teasing out “core elements 
of an interactive relation” between representatives and the rep-
resented. It thus seems that rather than singling out one specific 
form of representation, Pitkin aimed to show different facets of 
legitimate representation, which is first and foremost a social rela-
tion and therefore not free of power. This is where the argument 
for “descriptive representation” comes to the fore. This facet of 
representation focuses on representatives’ shared social character-
istics with their constituents. Yet, Köhler appears to dismiss the 
importance of “descriptive representation” rather quickly on the 
grounds of the representatives’ capability to empathise, allowing 
them to anticipate the best interest of those represented (148).
However, as is seen in migration and refugee policies there is a real 
danger of paternalistic co-optation of interests and needs of the 
represented. Other examples are the women’s and civil rights move-
ment where the hope for empathy of white, male decision-makers 
had proven to be an insufficient basis for the protection of inter-
ests, rights, and dignity of affected groups. While shared social 
characteristics cannot guarantee that the representative will act as 
intended by the elector, without any representatives that share so-
cial characteristics “certain points of view will simply be ignored”. 
The inclusion and discussion of the experiences of these (former) 
non-voice-parties and the “politics of presence” could have given 
the debate on representation a bit more substance.
It could have also softened some of the uncomfortable implica-
tions that arise from Köhler’s inclusion of future generations in 
the category of non-voice-parties. Clearly, a representative with 
shared social characteristics is not possible in the case of future 
generations. However, it is and was important for the groups he 
identifies as non-voice-parties. In his understanding, the range 
of non-voice-parties includes children, whose interest may le-
gitimately be represented by their parents (113); foreigners with 
limited electoral rights; and women who successfully fought for 
their political representation and as such are considered a former 
non-voice-party (148). The categorisation of these widely differ-
ing groups as non-voice-parties bears the danger of an equalisa-
tion of these groups in more than the intended comparative way.
First, the problem arises with the “traditional” non-voice-parties. 
The defining characteristic of children in Köhler’s reconstruction 
is that they are persons in need of parental care (111f ), yet none-
theless, they are part of the same category as are women and for-
eigners. This activates a frame of “in need of care” that is the basis 
for the aforementioned paternalistic co-optation of interests and 
historically has been used just to this end.
Second, the main characteristic of Köhler’s non-voice-parties is 
their lack of vote in contrast to citizens whose main characteristic 
is the opportunity to vote (136). He further states that he takes 
future generations as “representatives of non-voice-parties” (109). 
Yet, with this argument he appears to be revitalising the difference 
between groups without the opportunity to vote and groups with-
out the possibility to vote. A language-sensitive perspective eluci-
dates that language is not innocent and categorising is a way of 
producing social reality. To specify: future generations are not yet 
existent; their definition as being existent in some possible future 
prevents them from articulating their interests in the present. This 
is very different from the other-mentioned groups categorised and 
traditionally understood as non-voice-parties. Summarising them 
under the single category of non-voice-parties bears the danger of 
treating them as analytically equal. This is giving way to a possible 
naturalisation of their non-representation. It suggests that it is as 
unfeasible for children (and by extension women and foreigners) 
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to voice their interests as it is for people not yet existing. Most 
importantly, the equal treatment of future generations and dis-
enfranchised groups bears the danger of applying the same lower 
criteria that are established for the representation of future genera-
tions to other groups classified as non-voice-parties. This may lead 
to arguments for their exclusion and further hierarchising society.
Since it is the declared goal of the book to do the opposite – pro-
vide arguments for more representation – a broader and more 
nuanced discussion of “descriptive representation” would have 
been beneficial.
In conclusion, Köhler argues to take the revolutionary core of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seriously and to im-
plement it in democratic rule. In order to do so, he argues, the 
definition of the people needs to be widened (157). He shows 
how this argument is actually rooted in classical democracy and 
contractual theory that operate with a pessimistic idea of human 
beings. His contribution is thus to prove that the philosophical 
basis of Western democracy calls for the representation of the in-
terests of all those possibly affected by state actions. He provides a 
line of argumentation for the representation of future generations 
and highlights the timeliness of contractual theorists in today’s 
democracies.
After the almost revolutionary call for a widening of the concept of 
the people, however, the suggested restrictions that may lead to the 
representation of non-voice-parties are based on considerations of 
Realpolitik and seem rather conservative. This leaves the reader a bit 
disillusioned and gives way to the question whether the analytical 
non-discrimination between people who cannot vote and people 
who are not allowed to vote really is desirable and legitimate.
Notes
1 Nullmeier 2010.
2 Kühne 2015: 463.
3 Weale 2007: 146.
4 Phillips 1995: 31.
5 Weale 2007: 211f.
6 Yanow 2002.
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